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The development of globalized digital networks offers the
opportunity to explore the relationship between interlaced markets in
digital goods and regulatory goods. The low marginal cost of networked
electronic distribution can be expected to facilitate consumer "exit" from
their own jurisdiction to seek more favorable prices for digital goods.
This environment may cause a breakdown of the traditional rationale for
intellectual property protection, as nations "race to the bottom"
attempting to attract electronic commerce in digital goods. Such a "race
to the bottom" can be curbed by international centralization of
intellectual property regulation, but potentially by sacrificing beneficial
consequences of international regulatory competition. The trade-off
between these regulatory options should prompt us to reexamine the
structure of international regulatory structures, as well as the desirable
level of global harmonization of intellectual property law.
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The Internet is changing international law because it is accelerating
the erosion of the dominance of traditional sovereign states at the same
time that it facilitates new institutional mechanisms for making, applying,
and enforcing law. Sovereignty itself is becoming a diffuse concept,
accommodating new kinds of nongovernmental organizations performing
traditional sovereign functions. Democratization increases the potency of
international law, and cultural diffusion and interpenetration of formal
legal decisions and norms erode geographically based boundaries. The
Internet accelerates all the phenomena shaping international law by
making it easier to establish, access, and enforce norms. For the Internet
to have desirable effects, there must be freedom of access to public

information and a competitive structure at every level of the "stack" of
communications and content elements of the world's telecommunications
and information infrastructure. International freedom of information
should be extended by decisional law and by national implementation of
the core principles of the American Freedom of Information Act.
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THEORY OF DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING IN COMPLEX
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SYSTEMS
Cyberspace represents a domain of human interaction that is as
divorced from considerations of physical geography as any in human
history. As we spend more and more of our time there, it will begin to
stimulate new questions about, and insights into, the very fundamental
role played by physical space, physical proximity, and physical power in
legal and other rule-making systems. We have chosen to explore these
questions through the lens of the theory of complex systems. We discuss
one efficient method of finding optimal configurations of complex
systems-what Stuart Kauffman calls "patching," the division of a system
into non-overlapping but coupled self-optimizing parts-and show that
the efficiency of this problem-solving algorithm appears to depend
crucially on the relationship between within-patch and between-patch
Decentralized decision-making
spillover effects ("externalities").
processes in socio-legal systems-systems of "competitive federalism"may represent examples of this patching algorithm at work in the complex
system of human rule-making institutions. We discuss the normative
implications of this view for the design of such institutions where existing
patch boundaries are being substantially perturbed (as is the case for
interactions among geographically separated but newly connected
individuals in cyberspace).
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

A. Michael Froomkin

1101

Arguing that the common theme of the Burk, Post and Johnson, and
Perritt papers is the relationship of the Internet to the causes and
consequences of the rise of supra-nationalism, Professor Froomkin
suggests that what was intended and promoted as a great anarchistic,
liberating, democratizing technology may in fact spur a reaction so strong
as to make the world significantly less democratic. Governments and
vested interests may conclude that the only way to maintain their position
is to band together with like-minded counterparts in other countries and
enact multi-lateral treaties or vest increasing power in supra-national
organizations. As a result, the power of existing democratic institutions
could be reduced worldwide. Professor Froomkin dubs this "the great
looming Internet irony."
REGULATION OF THE INTERNET: THREE PERSISTENT FALLACIES
Jack Goldsmith 1119
In this essay, Professor Goldsmith contends that the principal papers
each illustrate a fallacy that pervades the Internet regulation literature.
He argues that the argument by David Post and David Johnson
erroneously assumes that cyberspace is a place hermetically separate from
the "real" world; that Dan Burk's analysis of the Internet's effect on

national copyright regulation rests on a common but incomplete
understanding of how nations regulate transnational transactions; and
that Dean Perritt's claim that the Internet will strengthen international
law exemplifies the Internet literature's unjustified optimism about the
promise of cheap, plentiful information. Professor Goldsmith claims that
each of these errors results from focusing on what is new about the
Internet at the expense of focusing on what is old about it.
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In reviewing the Burk, Perritt, and Post and Johnson papers, Ms.
Katz finds the source of the Internet's power as a social phenomenon in
its chaotic diversity. The Internet is not now, and should not become, a
unified system. People understandably try to force new phenomena into
old paradigms but that can limit the Internet's potential and deny to us a
valuable tool for examining again the age-old question, "what is law
anyway?"
BEFORE CYBERSPACE: LEGAL TRANSITIONS IN PROPERTY RIGHTS
REGIMES
RichardA. Epstein 1137
Technology innovations neither preclude nor require changes in the
legal regimes that govern the creation of property rights or the
enforcement of contracts. Where a system of exclusive private rights and
contracts allows the continued operation of competitive markets, then
normally no transition in legal rules is needed. The appropriate
adjustments in legal rights can be funneled through changes in the terms
of private contracts. But once technology gives rise to new network
industries, then the appropriate benchmark becomes the historical law of
common carriers, with its duties of universal access on nondiscriminatory
terms. In these network industries, the choice of an optimal property
regime will be both contested and uncertain. The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 offers ample testimony to the mistakes in system design that
follow from rapid fire technological innovation.
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The information market in cyberspace is shifting from a regulatory
regime into a private ordering regime. Cyberspace facilitates such a
regime by allowing information providers to distribute their works subject
to contracts. These self-made norms are gradually displacing copyright
rules and change the terms of access to information. Private ordering
advocates argue that this emerging regime is superior to the copyright
regime, and that priority should be given to terms of access created by
contracts even when they conflict with copyright policies. This view is
based on two seemingly different types of arguments: one is an economic
argument and the other is based on political theory. This paper critically
examines the arguments made by the two approaches and highlights their
shared assumptions. It argues that contracts alone cannot secure public
access to information on reasonable terms and cannot guarantee the
vitality of the public domain. It therefore concludes that private ordering
should be subject to scrutiny under copyright principles.
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The premise of this essay is a prediction: the creators of intellectual
products suitable for distribution on the Internet will soon come to rely
less and less on copyright law to enable them to charge consumers who
wish access to their products and more and more on a combination of
contractual rights and technological protections. The essay argues that
courts and legislatures should facilitate and reinforce that shift but should
require that creators (and consumers), when setting up such "private"
arrangements, abide by restrictions designed to protect the public interest.
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Mark A. Lemley

1257

A number of scholars have suggested that the law should defer to
social norms on the Internet, either by abdicating its role entirely to
cyberspace self-governance, or by carving out particular roles for nonlegal
rulemaking. Professor Lemley challenges these assertions. He argues
that Internet norms are elusive and rapidly changing, and that in most
cases there is nothing like the consensus required for norm creation. He
contends that Internet norms are likely to be inefficient, particularly when
they are enforced by the underlying threat of exclusion from the network
itself. Finally, Professor Lemley suggests that neither Net "vigilantes,"
judges, nor code itself can be relied upon to identify and enforce Internet
norms with an appropriate sensitivity to efficiency and policy concerns.
THE MYTH OF PRIVATE ORDERING: REDISCOVERING LEGAL
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Much of the present discussion casts the debate about the form of
governance for cyberspace in stark terms- "top-down" hierarchical rules
versus spontaneous "bottom-up" coordination-with self-ordering based
on contracts and private agreements rather than public laws appearing
both preferable and more likely to evolve. Following up on arguments
presented by Professors Fisher and Elkin-Koren in this symposium, Radin
and Wagner point out that the dichotomy between top-down and bottomup obscures that a self-ordering regime brought about by networks of
contracts cannot stably exist without an established background of laws
against which to enforce these agreements. They argue that cyberspace
advocates should be debating the ingredients of good mixtures of private
and public ordering rather than positing the choice between state control
and anarcho-cyberlibertarianism. Because the enforcement of rules in
cyberspace will depend largely upon the ultimate remedy of banishment,
Radin and Wagner argue that such enforcement will test the restraint of
territorial sovereigns to whom any banishment might be appealed; unless
there is considerable agreement about baseline rules among territorial
sovereigns, any self-enforcement in cyberspace may well be unstable.
They therefore conclude that a necessary ingredient for self-ordering in
cyberspace is the development of global minimal background standards of
due process and public policy limits on private agreements-and that such

harmony has a better chance of emerging if advocates do not forget that
contractual self-ordering cannot exist without it.
THE INTERNET, SECURITIES REGULATION, AND THEORY OF LAW
Tamar Frankel 1319
The Internet has transformed the way we retain, transfer, and
exchange information. The use of the Internet has already begun to
change the way information about securities is disseminated and the way
securities are traded, two activities regulated by the securities laws. This
article addresses the question of whether and how the securities laws
should be adapted to the use of the Internet, and more generally, to begin
an inquiry on how we should think about adapting law to a changing
environment of actors and actions subject to law. Professor Frankel
suggests that law changing is surprisingly similar to the way new scientific
theories are fashioned: conflicting with some parts and containing and
reaffirming other parts of their predecessors. She then applies the
generalizations to select changes in the securities acts that address the
Internet environment, including the choice of adaptive mechanisms.
SHOULD THE SEC REGULATE THE CYBER SECURITIES MARKET?
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR FRANKEL
Omri Yadlin 1355
Professor Yadlin comments on Professor Frankel's view that current
SEC regulatory mechanisms are appropriate for governing the emerging
Internet-based securities market. The traditional mechanisms may
impede the evolution of an efficient cyber stock market. Laws limiting
issuer and investor freedom of speech do not allow agents to interact as
effectively as the Internet allows. Cooperation and interaction between
the SEC and the market should be based on consent and on competition
between regulators rather than on coercion.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT
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As people become enamored with the possible benefits of allowing
price discrimination in contracts for intellectual goods, they should realize
that traditional intellectual property law works by fostering price
discrimination among customers. This simple fact has implications for
federal pre-emption, and is a reminder of the complexity of the economic
issues involved. Increasing a seller's ability to price discriminate will often
involve increasing his monopoly power, with dubious welfare effects.
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Courts apply prosecution history estoppel to limit how far the
doctrine of equivalents can broaden a patent's scope. In WarnerJenkinson, the Supreme Court declared that the presumption that
prosecution history estoppel applies may be rebutted by the patentee.

Mr. Noe argues that making the presumption rebuttable increases the
uncertainty surrounding the scope of a valid patent, and thereby erodes
the notice function of patent claims. To remove this burden of
uncertainty, Mr. Noe suggests that the Federal Circuit narrowly and
clearly confine the manner in which the patentee can attempt to rebut the
presumption, bounding any such attempts by the public record.
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